CamoDocs: A Poisoning Attack Against Retrieval-Augmented Language Models Using Camouflaged Documents
- 类型:arxiv
- 标识:2608.28389
- 链接:http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28389v1
- 主分类:rag
- 形态:method
- 被引:1
- 被引来源:Semantic Scholar
- S2被引:1
- OpenAlex被引:0
- 影响力被引:0
- TLDR:CamoDocs is proposed, a poisoning attack that avoids direct query inclusion by camouflaging adversarial documents among benign content, and shows that erasure-heavy clustering defenses such as TrustRAG can reduce ASR, but only with substantial utility drops on retrieval-dependent benchmarks such as NeoQA.
- OpenAlex ID:W7204748151
- OpenAlex DOI:10.48550/arxiv.2608.28389
- DOI:10.48550/arxiv.2608.28389
- DOI来源:OpenAlex
- 开放获取:green
- 开放获取链接:https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2608.28389
- OpenAlex更新:2026-09-02
- 副分类:risk
- 待LLM分类:否
- 标题中文:CamoDocs:利用伪装文档针对检索增强语言模型的投毒攻击
- TLDR中文:提出 CamoDocs,一种通过将对抗文档伪装在良性内容中来避免直接包含查询的投毒攻击,并表明 TrustRAG 等以擦除为主的聚类防御可降低 ASR,但会在 NeoQA 等依赖检索的基准上造成显著的效用下降。
- 来源文件:
- /inbox/tom/_candidates/2026-09-01-agent-rag-longcontext-candidates.json
- [OpenAlex backfill]
- [S2 enrich]